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Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory SafetyYannik Moy∗†‡† ‡Thème SYM  Systèmes symboliquesProjets ProValRapport de reherhe n ????  July 2007  51 pagesAbstrat: We propose an original approah for heking memory safety of C pointerprograms possibly inluding pointer arithmeti and sharing (but no asts, strutures, doubleindiretion or memory dealloation). This involves rst identifying aliasing and strings,whih we do in a loal setting rather than through a global analysis as it is done usually.Our separation analysis in partiular is a totally new treatment of non-aliasing. We presentfor the rst time two abstrat latties to deal with loal pointer aliasing and loal pointer non-aliasing in an abstrat interpretation framework. The key feature of our work is to ombineabstrat interpretation tehniques and dedutive veriation. The approah is modularand ontextual, thanks to the use of Hoare-style annotations (pre- and postonditions),allowing to verify eah C funtion independently. Abstrat interpretation tehniques areused to automatially generate suh annotations, in an idiomati way: standard pratieof C programming is identied and inorporated as heuristis. Abstrat interpretation anddedutive veriation are both used to hek these annotations in a sound way. Our rstontribution is the design of an abstrat domain for impliations, whih makes it possibleto build eient ontextual analyses. Our seond ontribution is an eient bak-and-forthpropagation method to generate ontextual annotations in a modular way, in the frameworkof abstrat interpretation. Thanks to previously unknown loop renement operators, thispropagation method does not require iterating around loops. We implemented our methodin Cadueus, a tool for the veriation of C programs, and suessfully veried automatiallythe C standard string library funtions.Key-words: C programming language, abstrat interpretation, dedutive veriation,pointer programs, aliasing, memory safety
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Sûreté mémoire des programmes C à pointeursRésumé : Nous présentons une approhe originale pour vérier la sûreté des aès mé-moires des programmes C à pointeurs pouvant ontenir de l'arithmétique de pointeurs et dupartage (mais pas de asts, de strutures, de double indiretion ou de libération mémoire).Cela onsiste en premier lieu à identier le partage mémoire et les haînes de aratères, eque nous faisons dans un ontexte loal plutt que par une analyse globale omme 'est leas habituellement. Notre analyse de séparation mémoire en partiulier est omplètementnouvelle. Nous présentons pour la première fois deux treillis pour l'interprétation abstraitequi permettent de traiter le partage et le non-partage mémoire de façon loale. La prini-pale aratéristique de notre analyse est la ombinaison de l'interprétation abstraite et de lavériation par preuve. Notre approhe est modulaire et ontextuelle, grâe à l'utilisationd'annotations à la Hoare (pré- et post-onditions), e qui permet d'analyser haque fon-tion de manière séparée. On utilise les tehniques d'interprétation abstraite pour générerautomatiquement es annotations, de façon idiomatique: les pratiques standard de pro-grammation en C sont identiées et inorporées omme des heuristiques. L'interprétationabstraite et la vériation dédutive sont toutes deux utilisées pour vérier es annotationsde manière sûre. Notre première ontribution est la réation d'un domaine abstrait pour lesimpliations, e qui rend possible la onstrution d'analyses ontextuelles eaes. Notreseonde ontribution est une méthode de propagation arrière-avant eae qui génère desannotations ontextuelles de façon modulaire, dans le adre de l'interprétation abstraite.Grâe à des opérateurs de ranement originaux, ette méthode de propagation ne néessitepas d'itérer autour des boules du programme. Nous avons implémenté ette méthode dansCadueus, un outil pour la vériation de programmes C, e qui nous a permis de vérierautomatiquement les fontions de la librairie C standard de manipulation des haînes dearatères.Mots-lés : Langage C, interprétation abstraite, méthodes dédutives, vériation, pro-grammes à pointeurs, partage mémoire, sûreté mémoire
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4 Moy & Marhé1 Introdution1.1 RationaleThis work originated from the observation that no urrently available tool an guarantee theabsene of threat on memory safety on real C programs used in embedded devies. Althoughexperiened C programmers an easily review small to medium programs for memory safety,those tools are defeated by quite simple programs, with few aliasing and no asts. The mainreasons for this situation are the lak of support in these tools for widely spread C idioms,as well as the programmers' ability to understand omments embedded in the ode, thatreveal some invariants or preonditions for the programs to be orret.Our primary goal is to address the rst of these onerns, to inrease the tools knowledgeof idiomati C, in a setting whih already allows progress on the seond onern by givingprogrammers the ability to formally speify their additional knowledge of the programs'logi. The subset of C that we target inludes those onstruts that usually make theveriation task diult: pointer arithmeti, dynami alloation, aliasing and strings.Our seondary goal is to allow real modular veriation of programs, that ts as muhas possible the programmers' understanding of modularity. While most tools base theirmodular veriation on some best guess for stubbing the missing parts of programs, a morehuman-oriented modularity would fous on the assumptions needed to make programs or-ret. This is what we do.Our third and last goal supports the realization of modular veriation, where the basimodules of a C program are its funtions. Many C funtions an be alled in a number ofvalid ontexts (think of the nullity of pointer arguments), with dierent behaviours and dif-ferent assumptions. Merging these ontexts makes no sense, whih is why ontext-sensitivityis a key feature for verifying these programs. Classially, the ontext of interest is taken tobe the alling ontext, in a top-down analysis of the all-graph. Our approah fouses on theontexts needed by a funtion's body to make programs orret, in a bottom-up approah.As a general rule, we do not emphasize generality but t-for-purpose: our analysis shouldbe able to verify the memory safety of largeC programs used in real embedded software. Ourmethod does not yet support asts, strutures, double indiretion and memory dealloation.Inluding any of these features in our target language will require new tehniques in additionto the ones we present here.1.2 Useful tehniques that prove . . .
. . . but also tehniques that prove useful. We use a novel ombination of powerful tehniques:abstrat interpretation and dedutive veriation.1.2.1 Abstrat interpretationAbstrat interpretation, or AI for short, is a tehnique to automatially build models ofprograms in some hosen diretions of abstration, whih allows to infer many useful invari-
INRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 5ants on the models that are true on the programs too. AI works by suessive iterations onthe program's ontrol ow that ollet the sets of values of variables in the model at eahpoint.An abstrat lattie is an algebrai struture that desribes the ordering relation in themodel, so that eah iteration an only inrease a value in this ordering. A lattie is usuallybest desribed by a tuple (L,⊏L,⊥L,⊤L,⊔L,⊓L), where:
L is the set of elements in the lattie
⊏L is the ordering relation
⊥L is the least element in the lattie
⊤L is the greatest element in the lattie
⊔L is the union (join) of elements in the lattie
⊓L is the intersetion (meet) of elements in the lattieAn important property is that ⊔L and ⊓L are onsistent with respet to the ordering ⊏L:
x ⊏L y ⇒ (x ⊔L y = y ∧ x ⊓L y = x) (1)An abstrat domain is an abstrat lattie together with transfer funtions that over-approximate the eet of a program statement on a value in this lattie. Of partiularimportane are the transfer funtions for assignment and test. Abstrat domains an beombined by a variety of tehniques to get more preise information on the program thanthrough separated analyses.Connetion between the program and its model is done through a Galois onnetion
(αL, γL), where the abstration funtion αL maps eah set of onrete program states intoan abstrat element of L, and the onretization funtion γL maps eah abstrat element of
L to a set of onrete program states.For the lattie to orretly over-approximate the set of possible program behaviours, weneed the following properties on the onrete side:
γL(x ⊔L y) ⊃ γL(x) ∪ γL(y) (2)
γL(x ⊓L y) ⊂ γL(x) ∩ γL(y) (3)
γL ◦ αL(s) ⊃ s (4)Most latties we use in pratie are stable by intersetion, or onvex. Then we anrewrite equation (3) to:
γL(x ⊓L y) = γL(x) ∩ γL(y) (5)On domains with latties of bounded height, onvergene is ensured by the monotoniityof transfer funtions. To aelerate onvergene, or to ensure it in the general ase, awidening operator an be provided. It is used to provide an over-approximation of the setof reahable states of the program.RR n° 0123456789
6 Moy & Marhé1.2.2 Dedutive veriationDedutive veriation, orDV for short, is a tehnique to automatially or interatively proveor disprove validity of formulas in some hosen logi. We will be interested in formulas of rst-order logi with quantiers and integer arithmeti, whih arise naturally when onsideringmemory safety in C.Assertions of interest about programs an be transformed into suh formulas by om-puting Hoare-style weakest preonditions for these assertions. These are based on Hoarelogi, that gives rules to reason about Hoare triples. A Hoare triple is a logial formuladenoted {P} i {Q}, where P and Q are logial formulas in the underlying logi and i is astatement of the language found in the program. In the general ase, we an use as atomin the underlying logi any side-eet free expression in our language. In our ase, we willrestrit atoms to side-eet free expressions based only on variables and a few arithmetioperators. Equation 6 denes validity for Hoare triples, where S1 and S2 are sets of states,
i
−→ is the transition relation between sets of states for statement i and we write S |= Pwhen formula P is valid in the set of states S.
{P} i {Q} ≡ ∀S1, S2. (S1
i
−→ S2) ∧ (S1 |= P )→ (S2 |= Q) (6)The following are valid Hoare triples:
{x = 1} x = x+ 2; {x = 3} {x = y} x = x+ y; {x = 2y}Here, the symbol = is overloaded to denote both the assignment statement in i and theequality symbol in P and Q.When i is the entire body of a funtion, we all P a preondition for this funtion and Q apostondition for this funtion. When the orresponding triple is valid, alling that funtionin a state that makes the preondition valid ensures that it ends in a state that makes thepostondition valid. When i is a loop body, we ask for P and Q to be idential, and weall it a loop invariant. When the orresponding triple is valid, entering the loop for therst time in a state that makes the loop invariant valid ensures that, upon exiting the loop,the same invariant is still valid. We are not onsidering here the problem of termination,whih requires dierent annotations (e.g., loop variant) to ensure progress. We onsidernon-terminating omputations as valid ones, exept they may not exit from a loop or returnfrom a funtion.We are mostly interested in the automati proof of the veriation onditions produedby translating program assertions into Hoare triples. We do not detail here the inner workingof automati provers, like Simplify [13℄, Yies [15℄ or Ergo [11℄, that we will use as blakboxes that answer yes, no or don't know to queries about validity of formulas.1.2.3 Common languageSine we aim at making AI and DV ollaborate, we need a ommon language to ommuniatetheir results. The natural language to do so is rst-order logi without quantiers. We willsee how quantiers an be hidden in speial variables that we desribe in Setion 3.3.INRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 7AI does not work diretly with logial formulas. Instead, there is a natural translation,for eah abstrat domain we onsider, from an abstrat value of that domain to a quantier-free formula. The abstrat value and the formula represent the same set of onrete values.We an go further and onsider the domain of equality and inequality formulas, like we doin Setion 3.7. This is a kind of light prediate abstration, that we an diretly express inAI. We will use this equivalene of an abstrat value and a rst-order formula in Setion 3.5,when we desribe our method, to apply tehniques of prediate alulus like Fourier-Motzkinelimination.In the following, we will use the notation a for the negation of a, if a is a formula, or theomplement of a, if a is a set of elements.1.3 Context of interestWe developed our method together with an implementation in Cadueus, a tool dediatedto the veriation of C programs. Cadueus aepts as input a subset of C exluding astsand unions, but with full support for pointers, dynami alloation, strutures and reursion.The memory model adopted for C is the Burstall-Bornat or omponent-as-array one [8, 6℄.A JML-like language [25℄ allows programmers to annotate their C ode with preonditions,postonditions, invariants and the like. This annotation language allows, in partiular, toexpress logial properties not expressible in C, like validity of a pointer, so that Cadueusan hek them. In our examples, these annotations will appear inside stylized C ommentsas in Figure 1.// requires: precondition for function f// ensures: postcondition for function fvoid f() {
. . .// invariant: loop invariantwhile (. . .) {
. . .}} Figure 1: Logial annotations in CadueusCadueus translates possibly annotated C ode into an intermediate funtional languagethat is fed into the veriation ondition generator Why. Why omputes Hoare-styleweakest preonditions and outputs veriation onditions for a variety of automati andinterative provers [?℄. This proess is sound only as muh as the prover used. Themain diulty is the addition of annotations that desribe, in the logi, the additionalknowledge programmers might have about programs. Our work tends to free programmersfrom adding logial annotations whih are seemingly rephrasing the ode, e.g., the trivial
RR n° 0123456789
8 Moy & Marhéinterval invariant on iterator i in the program exerpt of Figure 2, that depends on the alsotrivial preondition that preedes it.// requires: 0 ≤ svoid loop(int s) {int i = 0;// invariant: 0 ≤ i ≤ swhile (i++ < s) {
. . .}} Figure 2: Trivial annotations1.4 Target languageWe restrit our attention to a subset of C that exhibits the kind of onstruts that usuallymake automati veriation impossible: pointer arithmeti and aliasing. This subset is keptvery small intentionally for simpliity of exposition. We detail in Setion 5 how we dealwith more syntati statements. The urrent limitations onern the treatment of asts,strutures and memory dealloation:asts are not supported at all in Cadueus;strutures and double indiretion are supported by Cadueus, we just do not onsiderthem in our memory safety analysis;memory dealloation through alls to free is supported by the standard memory modelof Cadueus, not by the modied memory model we use here.Our small while-language, as dened in Figure 3, ontains only two base types: integersand haraters. Only one level of pointer is allowed, with no asts, whih impliitly meansthat the value of pointer variables annot be modied through aliasing. Only the memoryloation they point to an be modied through aliasing. Alloating memory is done by allingsome typed C++-like new operator. String literals are supposed to be mutable memorybloks, like the memory alloated by alling new . Usual C operations are allowed on integersand pointers, like pointer arithmeti and dereferening. Control ow statements are limitedto if branhing statements and while loops. Ansi C rules for syntax and semantis areadopted whenever appliable to this subset.In C ode samples, we will use == for equality testing and = for assignment, as om-manded by Ansi C. In logial formulas, we will use = for equality testing, as there is noambiguity with assignment there. Likewise, we will use C operators in C ode samples(e.g., <=) and their logial notation in logial formulas (e.g., ≤). Finally, we dene infor-mally the following onstruts that we use when dening our while-language. INRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 9
type ::= int | char Base type
| int ⋆ | char⋆ Pointer type
decl ::= type var Delaration
expr ::= lit Literal
| var Variable
| unop expr | expr unop Unary operation
| expr binop expr Binary operation
| expr assignop expr Assignment
| func(expr∗) Funtion all
| expr [expr ] Indexed aess
| new int [expr ] Int alloation
| new char [expr ] Char alloation
stat ::= expr ; Simple
| decl ; | decl = expr ; Delarations
| stat stat | { stat } Compound
| return expr ; Return
| lab : stat Label
| if (expr) stat else stat Double branhing
| if (expr) stat Single branhing
| while (expr) stat Loop
fundef ::= type func(decl∗) { stat } Funtion
prog ::= fundef ∗ ProgramFigure 3: While-language
lit is the set of literals (inluding integer, harater and string literals),
var , func and lab are respetively the sets of variable, funtion and label names,
unop is the set of C unary operators: ⋆ + − ∼ ! + + −− sizeofThe address-of operator & is not onsidered here, and this set inludes operators notinluded in unary operators in the standard.
binop is the set of C binary operators:
⋆ / % + − << >> < > <= >= == ! = & ∧ | && || ,This set inludes operators not inluded in binary operators in the standard.
assignop is the set of C assignment operators:
= ⋆ = / = % = + = − = <<= >>= & = ∧ = |=1.5 Method overview and motivating exampleSetion 2 will review the preliminary analyses needed for our modular and ontextual methodpresented in Setion 3 to work. Setion 4 will detail our implementation of these analysesRR n° 0123456789
10 Moy & Marhéand Setion 5 the experiments we made to show our method's eetiveness. We will nishwith related work in Setion 6 and future work in Setion 7. The example in Figure 4 willbe used throughout this paper to explain eah step of our analysis.har⋆ foo(har⋆ dest, har⋆ sr, int s) {har⋆ ur = dest;if (dest == 0) return 0;while (s−− > 0 && ⋆sr) {
⋆ur++ = ⋆sr++;}
⋆ur = '\0';return dest;} Figure 4: Motivating exampleThe intended meaning of funtion foo, when dest is not null, is to opy at most sharaters from string src to pointer dest , and then return dest . If dest is null, it returnsnull. It bears some resemblane with the standard string funtion strncpy , with dierenestoo (e.g., in foo, if the length of string src is less than s, no zero padding is added).2 Aliasing and stringsThe modular and ontextual analysis presented in Setion 3 does not deal by itself withpointers, but mostly with integers and booleans. It relies on the preliminary analyses pre-sented here to remove most pointer arithmeti and some loal aliasing, expliit some loalnon-aliasing and identify strings. The analyses that follow are independent and ould beapplied on their own in other ontexts. They lassify eah pointer value in the program (inits ontext of use) into:a base pointer, a ursor pointer or a omplex pointera string or a (plain) pointerA base pointer at program label L is one of three kinds: the initial value of a pointerparameter, the result of a all to new on an exeution path reahing L or the pointer valuereturned by a all to some funtion on an exeution path reahing L.A ursor pointer at program label L is a pointer value that an be shown to be alwaysaliased with some other onstant or variable oset expression from a same base pointer at L.We say the ursor pointer is based on the orresponding base pointer. E.g., if p is a basepointer, p+ 3 and p+ f(q[i]) are ursor pointers based on p. 11 C99 standard denes a similar notion of pointer based on an objet when formally dening keyword
restrict in 6.7.3.1., exept it is a syntati notion whereas ours is semanti.
INRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 11A omplex pointer at program label L is a pointer that is neither a base pointer nor aursor pointer.A string (or string pointer) at program label L is a pointer to an array of haratersterminated by a sentinel, the null harater.A (plain) pointer at program label L is a pointer that is not a string. We will use thename pointer for plain pointer when it is lear from the ontext that we exlude strings.2.1 Loal aliasingIt follows from the denition of ursor pointers that their ourrenes in the program ouldbe replaed by pointer expressions only mentioning base pointers. As suh, identifying asmany ursor pointers as possible is protable to veriation, sine it dereases the numberof pairs of pointers that ould be aliased.A quik look at the example of Figure 4 shows this is possible even if the most preisealiasing information is not available: in funtion foo, pointer variable cur at any programpoint is a ursor pointer based on pointer parameter dest . At the point of dereferening curin the loop, for example, cur is aliased to dest + i− 1. Unfortunately, inferring this kind ofaliasing information is not easy, it is the goal of the analysis presented in Setion 3. What ismuh easier is to introdue an integer variable cur_offset that follows the value of cur − destin the program. We an then replae ourrenes of cur with dest + cur_offset . This inturn allows us to disard totally pointer variable cur . The same an be done for ourrenesof src in the program, whih is a ursor pointer based on pointer parameter src (its owninitial value). Then we an replae ourrenes of src with src + src_self_offset 2, on theondition that pointer arithmeti on src is replaed by integer arithmeti on src_self_offset .Although the denitions of base and ursor pointers do not apply to integer variables, thesame transformation an be applied to s, whih beomes s + s_self_offset . The programresulting from those transformations is presented in Figure 5.The analysis needed for this program transformation an be formalized as AI over somespeial pointer domain, presented in Figure 6 with only two variables v1 and v2 and twointeger onstants c0 and c1, where elements point to their immediately greater element inthe lattie ordering. In order to easily name base pointers, we introdue temporary variablesto hold the result of alls to new or the result of alls to funtions that return a pointer (as instati single assignment transformation). For the same reason, we introdue loal variablesto replae parameter variables inside the funtion, so that the name of a parameter denotesonly the orresponding base pointer. We divide ursor pointers into index ones and osetones. Index pointers are aliased to some onstant oset expression from a base pointer.Oset pointers are aliased to some variable expression from a base pointer. This leads tothe introdution of integer oset variables to follow the value of this dierene from theurrent base pointer (whih may not be the same at all program points).2We use the name p_self_offset instead of p_offset when pointer p is a ursor pointer based on its owninitial value, to inrease readability.
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12 Moy & Marhéhar⋆ foo(har⋆ dest, har⋆ sr, int s) {int sr_self_oset = 0;int s_self_oset = 0;int ur_oset = 0;if (dest == 0) return 0;while (s + s_self_oset−− > 0 && sr[sr_self_oset℄) {dest[ur_oset++℄ = sr[sr_self_oset++℄;}dest[ur_oset℄ = '\0';return dest;} Figure 5: Example (ont.) : after loal aliasing transformation
complex
offset(v1 )
77ppppppppppp
. . . offset(v2 )
ggNNNNNNNNNNN
index (v1 , c0 )
66nnnnnnnnnnnn
index (v1 , c1 )
OO
. . . index (v2 , c0 )
OO
index (v2 , c1 )
hhPPPPPPPPPPPPFigure 6: Lattie for loal aliasingThe union and intersetion operations are easily derived from the lattie ordering. Sinethe height of this lattie is bounded, we do not need a widening operator. Eah programpoint is mapped to some abstrat value in the point-wise lattie that maps eah loal pointervariable to a value in the loal aliasing lattie. The transfer funtion for assignment is asexpeted: when assigning the pointer value v to pointer variable p, we ompute the abstratvalue for v using the urrent abstrat values of all loal variables, and dene this as the newabstrat value of p.Loal aliasing transformation uses the results of this analysis to remove pointer arith-meti, loal pointer aliasing and pointer variables that it replaes with integer arithmeti,equality on integers and integer variables. Before we transform the program at programpoint L, where pointer variable p is read or written, we need to take into onsideration theabstrat values assoiated to p not only at L but in all the program. Figure 7 shows anexample where p is always index of some other pointer (either q or r) at program points itappears. This allows us to disard p altogether, and replae its value by the orrespondingindex on base pointer q or r where it is read. Figure 8 shows a slighly modied version ofthis funtion, where p is read with a complex abstrat value for the last return statement.This makes it neessary to keep previous assignments to p.
INRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 13int⋆ ok(int⋆ q, int⋆ r, int s) {int⋆ p = q;// p is index (q , 0 )if (s > 0) {p = r;// p is index (r , 0 )return p;}// p is complex} Figure 7: Transformation possible
int⋆ ko(int⋆ q, int⋆ r, int s) {int⋆ p = q;// p is index (q , 0 )if (s > 0) {p = r;// p is index (r , 0 )}// p is complexreturn p;} Figure 8: Transformation problemThere are various ways to solve this problem. We simply deided to lift all abstratvalues assoiated to p to the topmost abstrat value kind in the lattie of Figure 6, amongall suh abstrat values. Figure 9 desribes this lifting in details. If needed, we ould resortto a more preise solution. A rst solution is to propagate bakward the abstrat valuesobtained by forward propagation. Iterated forward and bakward propagations may lead toa better xed point than the lifting just desribed. To go even further, we ould separatethe analysis of p's abstrat value from the atual ode needed to update p's value for futurereads. This would make it unneessary to hange the abstrat values omputed by forwardpropagation. The somewhat odd result would be that p's value ould be updated twie:one for writing p, one for writing p_offset .topmost kind index offset complexold abstrat value index (bp, c) index (bp,_) or offset(bp) _new abstrat value index (bp, c) offset(bp) omplexFigure 9: Lifting abstrat valuesThis lifting allows us to easily modify ourrenes of p in the program. Given a languagestatement at program point L that reads or writes p, and depending on the abstrat valueof p at L, Figure 10 desribes the transformation performed on the ode. We note [.]offsetthe interpretation of a pointer expression as an oset. We are guaranteed that suh aninterpretation exists when we use it in Figure 10 sine the loal aliasing analysis omputedan abstrat value of offset(bp) for p at that point. Figure 11 gives a partial denition forthis interpretation. If originally present in the program, logial annotations too have to betranslated, whih only adds minor pratial diulties. The last step of this transformationonsists in removing the denition of pointers that were lifted as index or offset , and tointrodue instead denitions for the oset variables used.
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14 Moy & Marhélanguage statement p p = ep is index (bp, c) bp +  ep is offset(bp) bp + p_oset p_oset = [e]offsetp is complex p p = eFigure 10: Lifting abstrat values
[p]offset =  if p is index (bp, c)
[p]offset = p_oset if p is offset(bp)
[e1 + e2]offset = [e1]offset + e2 if e1 is a pointer expression
[e1 − e2]offset = [e1]offset − e2 if e1 is a pointer expressionFigure 11: Partial denition of [.]offsetThis transformation allows us to remove all the simple pointer arithmeti and some loalaliasing, possibly all the loal aliasing introdued by loal variables in a funtion. Thesame analysis an also be used to rewrite pointer omparisons (resp. pointer dierenes) asinteger ones when omparing (resp. subtrating) ursor pointers with the same base pointer(or a ursor pointer with its base pointer). This is a simple but ruial step, sine it isommon pratie in C to use pointer arithmeti when iterating over an array for eienypurposes. When initialization is not a onern, either beause a stati analysis an guaranteethat all reads of pointer values our after proper initialization, or beause it reates theorresponding veriation onditions to be heked by DV, then we an improve preisionby adding a least element uninitialized to this lattie. We do not detail it here, but thistehnique an also be applied on integer expressions to help disover relational invariants.This is what we did when modifying ourrenes of s in Figure 5. Figures 12 and 13 showode samples before and after loal aliasing transformation.2.2 Loal non-aliasingSetion 2.1 did not deal with aliasing between dierent base pointers. This kind of aliasingannot in general be inferred loally, but aording to the following idiom, non-aliasing ofbase pointers an be loally inferred.Idiom 1 Given two dierent base pointers p and q, a memory loation written through somepointer expression based on p must not be onsequently read through some pointer expressionbased on q.This idiom expresses the loal uniqueness of names to aess modied memory loations.These names may not be unique in the original program, as far as they all refer to the samebase pointer. It failitates not only automated reasoning about the program but also humanreasoning, whih makes it important to follow in pratie. The easiest way to guaranteethat this idiom is respeted when base pointer p is read through after base pointer q isINRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 15int f(int);int⋆ g(int⋆ p, int n, int d) {int⋆ r;if (p == 0) {p = new int[n℄;}p += d;while (n−−) {
⋆p++ = 0;if (f(⋆p)) {r = p;}}return r;}har⋆ h(har⋆ p, int s) {har⋆ q;if (s > 0) {q = p+s;while (p < q) {p +=f(q−p);}return q;} else {q = new har[s℄;while (f(⋆q) > 0) {
⋆q++ = '\0';}return q;}} Figure 12: Original program
int f(int);int⋆ g(int⋆ p, int n, int d) {int p_self_oset = 0;int n_self_oset;int r_oset;if (p == 0) {p = new int[n℄;p_self_oset = 0;}p_self_oset = p_self_oset + d;while (n + n_self_oset−−) {p[p_self_oset++℄ = 0;if (f(p[p_self_oset℄)) {r_oset = p_self_oset;}}return p + r_oset;}har⋆ h(har⋆ p, int s) {int p_self_oset = 0;int q_oset;har⋆ q;if (s > 0) {q_oset = p_self_oset + s;while (p_self_oset < q_oset) {p_self_oset +=f(q_oset − p_self_oset);}return p + q_oset;} else {q = new har[s℄;q_oset = 0;while (f(q[q_oset℄) > 0) {q[q_oset++℄ = '\0';}return q + q_oset;}} Figure 13: After transformation
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16 Moy & Marhéwritten through is to ask for p and q to be separated. The need for annotations on pointerseparation in a modular setting has been noted previously in [24℄. Our ontribution is toallow automati inferene of these annotations, using idiom 1. We introdue three relatedprediates to express this non-aliasing property:
separated(p, q) expresses that pointers p and q do not point to the same memoryloation. This is not the same as asking for p 6= q, sine p and q may be equal as faras they do not point to some memory loation. An important suh ase is when p and
q are null.
full_separated(p, q) expresses that pointers p and q do not point to the same memoryblok. This is stronger than asking for simple separation. In our memory model,memory bloks alloated through dierent dynami alls to some alloation funtionare not reahable one from the other. This makes the full separation of p and qequivalent to the separation of p+ i and q + j for any integers i and j :
full_separated(p, q) ≡ ∀ int i, j. separated(p + i , q + j ) (7)
bound_separated(p,n, q ,m) expresses that the memory hunks deliminated by p in-luded and p+n exluded on one side, q inluded and q+m exluded on the other side,do not overloap. This is weaker than asking for full separation. Simple separation anbe seen as a speial ase of bounded separation:
separated(p, q) ≡ bound_separated(p, 1 , q , 1 ) (8)These relations between prediates an be formally stated as the lattie of Figure 14,where p and q are pointer variables and i, j, k and l are integers (not neessarily integeronstants). In our analysis, suh an integer i represents a onstant or symboli range [0..i[of indies at whih p is read or written in the funtion.
full_separated(p, q)
bound_separated(p,max (i , k), q ,max (j , l))OO
bound_separated(p, i , q , j ) 33fffffffffffffffffffffff bound_separated(p, k , q , l)kkXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
separated(p, q)
kkXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
33fffffffffffffffffffffffFigure 14: Lattie of separation
INRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 17Asking for any of these properties of base pointers an be formalized as a preonditionor postondition of funtions, depending on the kind of base pointers involved. Figure 15shows how these requirements an be translated into funtion preondition or postonditiondepending on the kind of base pointers involved in the separation prediate. Here sep-predis any of separated , bound_separated or full_separated .sep-pred(p,q) p is parameter p is result of new p is result of allq is parameter preondition true postonditionq is result of new true true postonditionq is result of all postondition postondition postonditionFigure 15: Separation preonditions and postonditionsWe put true in this table whenever the separation ondition holds by onstrution inour memory model, whih is the ase between pointers obtained by two dierent alls to
new , or suh a pointer and a parameter of the funtion. Separation between two parameterseasily translates to a preondition of the funtion. Separation with a pointer obtained asthe result of a all is more omplex. It involves knowing how this result was obtained, morepreisely we need to know whether this result an be pointing to the same memory blokas the arguments used for the all. Depending on this information, the separation onditionan be true, or expressed as a postondition on the alled funtion, whih an sometimestranslate to a preondition for the all.This denes a transfer funtion on the all-graph, to be used in AI over the lattie of Fig-ure 14, generating preonditions and postonditions of funtions along the way. On our moti-vating example, this results in a preondition for funtion foo, namely full_separated(dest , src),that amounts to asking for the non-overlapping of src reads and dest writes in the loop, whihis the expeted behaviour. Figures 17 and 18 show ode samples where the preonditionsare respetively ideal separation onditions based on idiom 1 and the atual separationonditions inferred by our analysis.
full_separated(p, q)
bound_separated(p,n, q ,+∞)OO
bound_separated(p, 1 , q ,+∞) 33gggggggggggggggggggg bound_separated(p,n, q ,n)kkWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW
bound_separated(p, 1 , q ,n)kkWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW 33ggggggggggggggggggggFigure 16: Possible preonditions for copyRR n° 0123456789
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hé// no preonditionvoid selet(int⋆ r, int⋆ p, int⋆ q) {if (⋆p < ⋆q) ⋆r = ⋆p;else ⋆r = ⋆q;}// requires: bound_separated(p, 1 , q ,n)void opy(int⋆ p, int⋆ q, int n) {int i = 0;while (i++ < n) ⋆p++ = ⋆q++;}// requires: separated(p, q)void min(int⋆ p, int⋆ q, int n) {int i = 0;while (++i < n) {selet(q, q, q+i);}opy(p, q, 1);} Figure 17: Ideal separation
// no preonditionvoid selet(int⋆ r, int⋆ p, int⋆ q) {if (⋆p < ⋆q) ⋆r = ⋆p;else ⋆r = ⋆q;}// requires: full_separated(p, q)void opy(int⋆ p, int⋆ q, int n) {int i = 0;while (i++ < n) ⋆p++ = ⋆q++;}// requires: full_separated(p, q)void min(int⋆ p, int⋆ q, int n) {int i = 0;while (++i < n) {selet(q, q, q+i);}opy(p, q, 1);} Figure 18: Atual separationThere is still room for improvements, in various diretions. Figure 16 shows the orderingbetween the atual preondition we nd for funtion copy , the ideal preondition we wouldlike to have, and various intermediate preonditions that would improve on the urrent one.2.3 Pointers and stringsPlain pointers and strings are used in quite dierent ways in programs. Knowing whihbase pointers are strings and whih are not allows us to infer useful information for eah.Being a string is not a type information in C, sine diret aess to the string representationallows (re)moving the null sentinel harater. This is more a typestate [34℄. While a type isa prediate that haraterizes an objet throughout the program, a typestate is a prediatethat haraterizes an objet at a preise loation in the program. First of all, only pointersto haraters are eligible for being strings. Otherwise, we approximate the string typestateusing the following idioms.Idiom 2 Some arguments of some library funtions alls are strings (e.g., both argumentsof alls to strat).Idiom 3 Charater pointers whose value at some index is tested for nullity are strings.These heuristis give us the seed information that we propagate bakward to infer stringpreonditions and postonditions on funtion parameters and funtion returns. We deneINRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 19a new prediate string for that purpose. Although the bakward propagation is not sound,whih is aeptable for an inferene method, the forward propagation that follows it has totake into aount the separation information to keep string information up-to-date. Overall,this bak-and-forth method is a partiular ase of the method we desribe in Setion 3. Wewill detail its speiities after the general method has been presented. A ruial point hereis that inferene is based on bakward propagation only, whih is the key feature to ensuremodularity.3 Modular and ontextual veriationWe designed a very preise intra-proedural analysis, that is both ow-sensitive and path-sensitive in order to apture the possible omplex data dependenes that aount for memorysafety. To make it salable despite its high loal preision, we adopted a modular frameworkto ommuniate preonditions and postonditions of funtions throughout the all-graph.Finally, our analysis is not so muh ontext-sensitive as ontextual: the ontext of interestfor analysing a funtion is not dened by the alling ontexts (ontext-sensitive analysis)but by need, aording to the funtion's body sensitivity to ontext (ontextual analysis).We onsider here that the preliminary analyses dealing with aliasing desribed in Se-tion 2 have been run, so that funtions have appropriate preonditions and postonditionson pointer separation. Also, most pointer arithmeti and loal aliasing should have beentransformed into integer manipulations. This leads to the intermediate annotated odeshown in Figure 20 for our running example. We will explain later how string informationis omputed, based on the general analysis we present here. Figure 19 presents our methodshematially.loalaliasing // loalnon-aliasing // strings orpointers // inferringpreonditions andloop invariants // provingmemorysafetyFigure 19: Shemati view of our method3.1 Veriation frameworksWe intend to infer neessary invariants based on Abstrat Interpretation (AI), and provememory safety either diretly by Abstrat Interpretation or by generating veriation ondi-tions for Dedutive Veriation (DV). In an optimized mode, we would like to prove memorysafety using AI whenever possible, and otherwise resort to DV. In a safer mode, we wouldprefer to use AI only for inferring invariants and preonditions, and leave all proofs to DV.In the following, we will refer to these veriation frameworks as:AI×DV : invariant generation by AI, proof by AI or DV
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hé// requires: full_separated(dest , src)har⋆ foo(har⋆ dest, har⋆ sr, int s) {int sr_self_oset = 0;int s_self_oset = 0;int ur_oset = 0;if (dest == 0) return 0;while (s + s_self_oset−− > 0 && sr[sr_self_oset℄) {dest[ur_oset++℄ = sr[sr_self_oset++℄;}dest[ur_oset℄ = '\0';return dest;} Figure 20: Example (ont.): before modular and ontextual analysisAI+DV : invariant generation by AI, proof by DV onlyIn either framework, ommuniation between AI and DV will be limited to loop invariantsand funtion preonditions, as well as the set of veriation onditions proved by AI in theontext of AI×DV.Another kind of ollaboration between AI and DV has been explored in [26℄, whereinvariants inferred by AI as well as the ounter-example from DV are given to DV, whihreturns if possible a rened loop invariant. This approah suers a drawbak that makesit diult to use in pratie and that our method avoids. It requires using DV repeatedly,whih is too ostly for being used on real programs.3.2 Memory modelWe build on the memory model of Cadueus [16℄, whih follows the Burstall-Bornat oromponent-as-array one [8, 6℄. It represents the memory by a nite set of variables, eahontaining an appliative map. We do not detail it more, as we rely only on very simpleassumptions on this memory model, sine we do not onsider strutures and asts. Eahpointer value has an assoiated blok that orresponds to the result of the initial all tosome alloation funtion. Memory bloks alloated through dierent dynami alls to somealloation funtion are not reahable one from the other.We rst dene a fresh base pointer p at runtime to be a base pointer that is fully separatedfrom all previously known base pointers q, so that full_separated(p, q) holds. In the smallwhile-language desribed in Figure 3 that we onsider here, there are only two ways to reatea fresh base pointer: either by using a string literal, whih reates a string pointer, or byalling operator new to alloate a blok of memory, whih reates a plain pointer. Thereis no way to dealloate a blok of memory, whih allows us to treat the length of a blokof memory as a onstant. String literals are treated muh like initialized bloks of memoryalloated with operator new , ended by a trailing null harater. INRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 21To formalize these informations about fresh base pointers, we introdue logial partialfuntions arrlen and strlen. On the AI side, the absene of quantiation makes it ostly toapply these partial funtions to all pointers, therefore we dene them only on base pointers.On the DV side, they are potentially dened for all pointers through quantiation. It isthe axiomatization that aurately gives their domain of denition.
arrlen(p) is the length of the array pointed-to by pointer p. It is potentially denedfor any pointer p.
strlen(p) is (not surprisingly) the length of the string pointed-to by p. It is potentiallydened only for strings, i.e. for pointers to null-terminated harater arrays.The following formulas hold for fresh base pointers, with n and m integer expressionsthat give respetively the size of the memory blok alloated by new and the size of thememory oupied by a string, inluding the trailing null harater.
arrlen(p) = n (9)
string(p)→ strlen(p) = m− 1 (10)Given a plain pointer or a string p, it is now possible to express the safety of a read orwrite aess to p at some index i as validity of a logial formula based on arrlen or strlen.To get simple and useful formulas, we rely on the following idioms.Idiom 4 A base pointer an be only read and written through at positive indies.Idiom 5 A string an only be read up to its sentinel null harater.Idiom 4 is trivially true for fresh base pointers, that point by onstrution to the begin-ning of a memory blok. After the loal aliasing transformation desribed in Setion 2.1, weexpet it to be true of all base pointers in most programs. Atually, this is mostly a on-venient idiom to simplify our implementation and failitate the work of automati provers.There is no theoretial diulty in adding a negative array length funtion. Idiom 5 isgenerally respeted for all unbounded data strutures terminated by a sentinel, in partiularfor strings. This leads to the following formulas for expressing the safety of a read aess
p[i], with p a pointer and i an integer expression.
p is a safe readplain pointer 0 ≤ i < arrlen(p)string 0 ≤ i ≤ strlen(p)Figure 21: Safety ondition for a read aessWriting to a string is more omplex, sine it may destroy the very fat it is a string.To inrease the preision of our analysis, we take into aount the expeted typestate ofRR n° 0123456789
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p is a after write, p is a v is null safe writepointer - - 0 ≤ i < arrlen(p)string pointer - 0 ≤ i ≤ strlen(p)string string yes 0 ≤ i ≤ strlen(p)string string - 0 ≤ i < strlen(p)Figure 22: Safety ondition for a write aessthe pointer after the write aess and the nullity of the value written. This leads to thefollowing formulas for expressing the safety of a write aess p[i], with p a pointer, i aninteger expression, and v the value written.On the AI side, arrlen(p) and strlen(p) are treated like meta-variables, whose valuehanges at runtime. Transfer funtions take those speial variables into aount with theirspeiities. In partiular, any information on strlen(p) impliitly arries the extra informa-tion that p is a string, i.e. that string(p) holds. Conversely, being a string an be expressedin terms of strlen(p).
string(p)→ 0 ≤ strlen(p) (11)Conversions from plain pointer to string and bak are reeted on the AI side between
arrlen(p) and strlen(p). When writing a null harater into a plain pointer p at positiveindex i, with p expeted to be a string after the assignment, the forward transfer funtionfor this assignment adds onstraints strlen(p) ≤ i and strlen(p) < arrlen(p) to the urrentabstrat state. Conversely, when writing into a string p at unbounded indies, e.g., in a loop,we loose the information that p is a string, whih translates on the AI side by adding theonstraint strlen(p) < arrlen(p) before removing information on strlen(p). AI knowledge of
arrlen and strlen semantis is otherwise limited to the basi equations that follow.
arrlen(0) = 0 (12)
string(p)→ 0 ≤ strlen(p) < arrlen(p) (13)On the DV side, arrlen and strlen are treated like uninterpreted funtions, for whih anappropriate axiomatization is given. We give here a simplied signature for these funtions.
arrlen : α pointer → int
strlen : α memory × α pointer → intThe type parameter α is used to make arrlen and strlen polymorphi in the type of pointerthey take as argument. The funtion strlen has an additional parameter that represents thememory state at the point it is alled, in order to take into aount the possibility of stringmanipulations. This extra parameter with respet to AI is set up automatially by the toolWhy in whih our plugin works, during the omputation of weakest preonditions. If p isa pointer, i an integer expression, m the memory state at the program point we onsider,
INRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 23C expression p+ i ∗p = v ∗plogial expression shift(p, i) upd(m, p, v) acc(m, p)Figure 23: Correspondane between C and logial expressions
v a value, we an write the orrespondanes given in Figure 23 between C expressions andtheir logial ounterpart.The axiomatization that follows denes the basi properties of arrlen and strlen. It usesthe existing logial funtions shift , upd and acc. Currently, lemmas derived from these ax-ioms are also given as axioms in order to failitate the task of DV. All variables that appearin these axioms are universally quantied. We do not show the prex of the prenex formhere to inrease readability.Reading or writing through a pointer p does not modify arrlen(p). Only the eet ofpointer arithmeti must be dened on arrlen(p).
0 ≤ i→ arrlen(shift(p, i)) = arrlen(p)− iThe evident relation between the length of a string and the size of the memory blok forthis string must be given.
0 ≤ strlen(m, p)→ strlen(m, p) < arrlen(p)The eet of pointer arithmeti on strlen(m, p) is the same as on arrlen(p).
0 ≤ i→ strlen(m, shift(p, i)) = strlen(m, p)− iReading a string inside its bounds returns a non-null harater. Reading it at its lengthindex returns the sentinel null harater.
0 ≤ i < strlen(m, p)→ acc(m, shift(p, i)) 6= 0
0 ≤ strlen(m, p)→ acc(m, shift(p, strlen(m, p))) = 0As expeted, writing a string is the more omplex operation. We onsider rst writing aharater in the string bounds.
0 ≤ i < strlen(m, p)→ strlen(upd(m, shift(p, i), v), p) ≤ strlen(m, p)We an be more preise if we know the value written is null or the opposite.
0 ≤ i ≤ strlen(m, p)→ strlen(upd(m, shift(p, i), 0), p) = i
0 ≤ i < strlen(m, p) ∧ v 6= 0→ strlen(upd(m, shift(p, i), v), p) = strlen(m, p)Writing a null harater may onstrut a string.
0 ≤ i→ 0 ≤ strlen(upd(m, shift(p, i)), 0) ≤ iRR n° 0123456789
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héIf we know all haraters are not null in the interval [0..i[, then we an give the atual lengthof the string reated.
0 ≤ i ∧ (0 ≤ j < i→ acc(m, shift(p, j)) 6= 0)→ strlen(upd(m, shift(p, i), 0), p) = iIt an ome to a surprise that strlen is axiomatized instead of being impliitly dened, likethis:
string(m, p) ≡ ∃ int i . i = strlen(m, p)
∧ acc(m, shift(p, i)) = 0
∧ ∀ int j. 0 ≤ j < i→ acc(m, shift(p, i)) 6= 0Early experiments with that formulation showed it was not adapted to DV, mostly beauseof the presene of existential quantiation. The interest of using strlen with axioms is tohide this quantier from DV.It an be seen from these axioms that strlen has quite a dierent meaning in DV thanin AI. While the emphasis is on idioms in AI, so that the inferred invariants are likely to beinvariants meant by the programmers, emphasis in DV is on ompleteness. The expressionof these axioms as linear inequalities is partiularly well suited for using automati DV, aswe will see in Setion 5 when we ompare with an alternate formulation. These experimentswith various memory models were only possible beause Cadueus provides a very parametribasi memory model.3.3 Meta-variables and uninterpreted funtionsSo far, we have seen that arrlen and strlen, that express respetively the size of a memoryblok and the length of a string, an be used as meta-variables generators in AI and asuninterpreted funtions in DV. This is a very useful trik that has been examplied by[10℄, where meta-variables serve as designator shortuts for expressions in the program andwhere they are used mostly as blak boxes whose validity only is heked by AI. We go astep further in two diretions with arrlen and strlen, sine we introdue for the purpose ofveriation extra expressions not mentioned in the program text, and we speialize transferfuntions in AI for these meta-variables.We now introdue other suh meta-variables generators: min and max . As expeted fromtheir name, min(a, b) represents the minimum of integer values a and b, while max (a, b)represents their maximum. Contrary to arrlen and strlen that only apply to the pointerspresent in the program text, min and max ould be used to generate an innity of meta-variables: min(a, b) but also min(strlen(p), a) and min(min(strlen(p), a), b), et. The waywe introdue suh variables in our analysis prevents us from generating an innity of thesevariables.We will see in Setion 3.5 why we need min and max . Their use in AI is derived fromtheir role as lower and upper bounds: when introduing min(a, b) or max (a, b), we also addthe following onstraints to the urrent abstrat value:
min(a, b) ≤ a ∧min(a, b) ≤ b INRIA
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max(a, b) ≥ a ∧max(a, b) ≥ bThe orresponding axioms are used in DV, we do not detail them here.3.4 Impliation lattieBefore we get into the bak-and-forth propagation that generates invariants from memorysafety onditions, we need to introdue a new lattie for propagating impliations like ψ → φthrough the ode.Consider two abstrat omplete latties A and B, with appropriate union and intersetionoperations, that we denote respetively ⊔ and ⊓. We assume there is a Galois onnetionfrom the set Φ of rst-order logi formulas without quantiers to both A and B (as in [10℄),where abstration and onretization funtions are denoted respetively aval and pred . Animpliation lattie A⇒ B of A and B is a lattie whose arrier CA⇒B is a subset of A×Bsuh that any pair (a, b) represents exatly the logial impliation of the onretizations of
a and b. By denition, the following relation holds:
predA⇒B(a, b)
∆
= predA(a)→ predB(b). (14)To allow more eient implementations, we do not require that the arrier is the full set
A×B. Instead, we extend the impliation lattie over A×B by mapping any pair (a, b) toa representative denoted a ⇀ b in the arrier suh that:
predA(a)→ predB(b) logially implies predA⇒B(a ⇀ b). (15)This mapping is the identity on representatives, so that we identify (a, b) and a ⇀ b on
CA⇒B . Take now a1 ⇀ b1 and a2 ⇀ b2 from CA⇒B . We dene a union and an intersetionoperations over A⇒ B as follows:
(a1 ⇀ b1) ⊔A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2)
∆
= (a1 ⊓A a2) ⇀ (b1 ⊔B b2) (16)
(a1 ⇀ b1) ⊓A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2)
∆
= (a1 ⊔A a2) ⇀ (b1 ⊓B b2) (17)To ensure intersetion orretly under-approximates onrete intersetion in the ases whereonly relation 15 holds, we still ask that equation 14 holds for speial abstrat values:
predA⇒B((a1 ⊔A a2) ⇀ (b1 ⊓B b2)) = predA(a1 ⊔A a2)→ predB(b1 ⊓B b2) (18)We dene a natural ordering on CA⇒B :
(a1 ⇀ b1) ≤A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2)
∆
= a2 ≤A a1 ∧ b1 ≤B b2, (19)and require that the extension to A×B respets this ordering:
a2 ≤A a1 ∧ b1 ≤B b2 logially implies (a1 ⇀ b1) ≤A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2). (20)Least and greatest elements are now easy to dene:RR n° 0123456789
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⊥A⇒B
∆
= ⊤A ⇀ ⊥B ⊤A⇒B
∆
= ⊥A ⇀ ⊤BTheorem 1 (A⇒ B,≤A⇒B ,⊥A⇒B ,⊤A⇒B ,⊔A⇒B ,⊓A⇒B) forms a omplete lattie.Proof. We rst show that ⊔A⇒B and ⊓A⇒B are ompatible with the ordering relation
≤A⇒B . Take a1 ⇀ b1 and a2 ⇀ b2 suh that (a1 ⇀ b1) ≤A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2).
(a1 ⇀ b1) ⊔A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2)
= (a1 ⊓A a2) ⇀ (b1 ⊔B b2) by (16)
= a2 ⇀ b2 by (19)and
(a1 ⇀ b1) ⊓A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2)
= (a1 ⊔A a2) ⇀ (b1 ⊓B b2) by (17)
= a1 ⇀ b1 by (19)From equation 20, we immediately get
a1 ⇀ b1 ≤A⇒B (a1 ⇀ b1) ⊔A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2),
a2 ⇀ b2 ≤A⇒B (a1 ⇀ b1) ⊔A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2),
(a1 ⇀ b1) ⊓A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2) ≤A⇒B a1 ⇀ b1,
(a1 ⇀ b1) ⊓A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2) ≤A⇒B a2 ⇀ b2.This proves the ompatibility of ⊔A⇒B and ⊓A⇒B with the ordering relation ≤A⇒B . Theexistene of a least and greatest elements of any set of elements in A⇒ B is a diret onse-quene of the denitions of ⊔A⇒B and ⊓A⇒B , given that A and B are themselves ompletelatties. By denition of ⊥A⇒B , ⊤A⇒B , those are the orret bottom anf top elements ofthis lattie. 2We assume there is a anonial monotone impliation form ψ → φ for any formula f ,suh that:
ψ = predA ◦ avalA(ψ). (21)A trivial suh formula is True → f . In partiular, we assume every impliation in the imageof predA⇒B is of this form. We also assume that Galois onnetion on A is in fat a Galoisinsertion:
a = avalA ◦ predA(a). (22)Abstration funtion avalA⇒B is dened by:
avalA⇒B(ψ → φ)
∆
= avalA(ψ) ⇀ avalB (φ). (23)Theorem 2 (avalA⇒B , predA⇒B ) denes a valid Galois onnetion between Φ and A⇒ B.Proof. By denition, avalA⇒B and predA⇒B are monotone funtions. First we prove that
predA⇒B ◦ avalA⇒B over-approximates identity. INRIA
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predA⇒B ◦ avalA⇒B(ψ → φ)
= predA⇒B(avalA(ψ) ⇀ avalB (φ)) by (23)
⇐ predA ◦ avalA(ψ)→ predB ◦ avalB(φ) by (15)
⇐ predA ◦ avalA(ψ)→ φ by (4)
= ψ → φ by (21)Next we prove that avalA⇒B ◦ predA⇒B under-approximates identity. To that end, we rstnotie that avalB ◦ predB(b) ≤B b, sine (avalB ,predB) is a Galois onnetion. Thereforeby 19:
(a ⇀ avalB ◦ predB(b)) ≤A⇒B (a ⇀ b) (24)Therefore:
avalA⇒B ◦ predA⇒B(a ⇀ b)
= avalA⇒B(predA(a)→ predB(b)) by (14)
= avalA ◦ predA(a) ⇀ avalB ◦ predB(b) by (23)
= a ⇀ avalB ◦ predB(b) by (22)
≤A⇒B a ⇀ b by (24)To be able to ompute in the abstrat, we must also prove that ⊔A⇒B over-approximatesthe onrete union and ⊓A⇒B under-approximates the onrete intersetion. We rst provethat ⊔A⇒B over-approximates the onrete union.
predA⇒B((a1 ⇀ b1) ⊔A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2))
= predA⇒B((a1 ⊓A a2) ⇀ (b1 ⊔B b2)) by (16)
⇐ predA(a1 ⊓A a2)→ predB(b1 ⊔B b2) by (15)
⇐ (predA(a1) ∧ predA(a2))→ (predB(b1) ∨ predB(b2)) by (2) and (3)
= (predA(a1)→ predB(b1)) ∨ (predA(a2)→ predB(b2)) by de Morgan
= predA⇒B(a1 ⇀ b1) ∨ predA⇒B(a2 ⇀ b2) by (14)We also prove that ⊓A⇒B under-approximates the onrete intersetion.
predA⇒B((a1 ⇀ b1) ⊓A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2))
= predA⇒B((a1 ⊔A a2) ⇀ (b1 ⊓B b2)) by (17)
= predA(a1 ⊔A a2)→ predB(b1 ⊓B b2) by (18)
⇒ (predA(a1) ∨ predA(a2))→ (predB(b1) ∧ predB(b2)) by (2) and (3)
= predA(a1) ∧ predA(a2) ∨ predB(b1) ∧ predB(b2) by de Morgan
⇒ predA(a1) ∧ predA(a2) ∨ predB(b1) ∧ predB(b2) by de Morgan
∨predA(a1) ∧ predB(b2) ∨ predB(b1) ∧ predA(a2)
= (predA(a1)→ predB(b1)) ∧ (predA(a2)→ predB(b2)) by de Morgan
= predA⇒B(a1 ⇀ b1) ∧ predA⇒B(a2 ⇀ b2) by (14)
2If B is stable by intersetion (onretization of intersetion is intersetion of onretiza-tion), e.g., for the onvex latties we use most often in pratie, we an also give an over-approximation ⋓A⇒B of the onrete intersetion:
(a1 ⇀ b1) ⋓A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2)
∆
= (a1 ⊓A a2) ⇀ (b1 ⊓B b2) (25)RR n° 0123456789
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predA⇒B((a1→ b1) ⋓A⇒B (a2→ b2))
= predA⇒B((a1 ⊓A a2)→ (b1 ⊓B b2)) by (25)
⇐ predA(a1 ⊓A a2)→ predB(b1 ⊓B b2) by (15)
⇐ (predA(a1) ∧ predA(a2))→ (predB(b1) ∧ predB(b2)) by (2) and (5)
= predA(a1) ∨ predA(a2) ∨ predB(b1) ∧ predB(b2) by de Morgan
⇐ predA(a1) ∧ predA(a2) ∨ predB(b1) ∧ predB(b2) by de Morgan
∨predA(a1) ∧ predB(b2) ∨ predB(b1) ∧ predA(a2)
= (predA(a1)→ predB(b1)) ∧ (predA(a2)→ predB(b2)) by de Morgan
= predA⇒B(a1 ⇀ b1) ∧ predA⇒B(a2 ⇀ b2) by (14)We note ⋒A⇒B the last useful operation that we an form using the union and intersetionoperations of A and B.
(a1→ b1) ⋒A⇒B (a2→ b2)
∆
= (a1 ⊔A a2)→ (b1 ⊔B b2) (26)This operation performs a union on both sides of the impliation, we will see shortly whywe need it.Denote I1 (resp. I2) the impliation lattie A⇒ B (resp. C ⇒ D). We all impliationprodut of I1 and I2, and denote I1 ⊗ I2, a new impliation lattie built from I1 and I2.Ordering is pair-ordering, where a pair is greater than another one if it is the ase for boththeir left and right elements. Union and intersetion are dened pairwise, like least andgreatest elements, as in a artesian or redued produt:
(a1 ⇀ b1, c1 ⇀ d1) ⊔I1⊗I2 (a2 ⇀ b2, c2 ⇀ d2)
= ((a1 ⇀ b1) ⊔A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2), (c1 ⇀ d1) ⊔C⇒D (c2 ⇀ d2)) (27)
(a1 ⇀ b1, c1 ⇀ d1) ⊓I1⊗I2 (a2 ⇀ b2, c2 ⇀ d2)
= ((a1 ⇀ b1) ⊓A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2), (c1 ⇀ d1) ⊓C⇒D (c2 ⇀ d2)) (28)This aounts for an easy modularization and parameterization of the analysis.Theorem 3 (I1 ⊗ I2,≤I1⊗I2 ,⊥I1⊗I2 ,⊤I1⊗I2 ,⊔I1⊗I2 ,⊓I1⊗I2) forms a omplete lattie.Proof. Same as artesian or redued produt. 2We dene onretization and abstration over this produt as follows:
predI1⊗I2(a ⇀ b, c ⇀ d)
∆
= (predA(a) ∧ predC(c))→ (predB(b) ∨ predD(d)), (29)
avalI1⊗I2(f)
∆
= (avalI1(f), avalI2(f)). (30)INRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 29Theorem 4 I1 ⊗ I2 with onretization predI1⊗I2 denes a valid abstration of Φ.Proof. First, we prove that predI1⊗I2 ◦ avalI1⊗I2 over-approximates identity. Here, theanonial form ψ → φ of a formula f must respet equation 21 for both latties A and C.Again, True → f is a valid suh formula.
predI1⊗I2 ◦ avalI1⊗I2(ψ → φ)
= predI1⊗I2(avalI1(ψ → φ), avalI2(ψ → φ)) by (30)
= predI1⊗I2(avalA(ψ) ⇀ avalB(φ), avalC(ψ) ⇀ avalD(φ)) by (23)
= (predA ◦ avalA(ψ)∧ predC ◦ avalC(ψ))→ (predB ◦ avalB(φ)∨ predD ◦ avalD(φ))by (29)
⇐ (predA ◦ avalA(ψ) ∧ predC ◦ avalC(ψ))→ φ by (4)
= ψ → φ by (21)We rst need to prove that ⊔I1⊗I2 over-approximates the onrete union.
predI1⊗I2((a1 ⇀ b1, c1 ⇀ d1) ⊔I1⊗I2 (a2 ⇀ b2, c2 ⇀ d2))
= predI1⊗I2((a1 ⇀ b1) ⊔A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2), (c1 ⇀ d1) ⊔C⇒D (c2 ⇀ d2)) by (27)
= predI1⊗I2((a1 ⊓A a2) ⇀ (b1 ⊔B b2), (c1 ⊓C c2) ⇀ (d1 ⊔D d2)) by(16)
= predA(a1 ⊓A a2) ∧ predC(c1 ⊓C c2)→ predB(b1 ⊔B b2) ∨ predD(d1 ⊔D d2)by (29)
⇐ (predA(a1) ∧ predA(a2) ∧ predC(c1) ∧ predC(c2)) → (predB(b1) ∨ predB(b2) ∨
predD(d1) ∨ predD(d2)) by (2) and (3)
= ((predA(a1)∧(predC(c1))→ (predB(b1)∨predD(d1))∨(predA(a2)∧predC(c2))→
(predB(b2) ∨ predD(d2)) by de Morgan
= predI1⊗I2(a1 ⇀ b1, c1 ⇀ d1) ∨ predI1⊗I2(a2 ⇀ b2, c2 ⇀ d2) by (29)We also prove that ⊓I1⊗I2 under-approximates the onrete intersetion.
predI1⊗I2((a1 ⇀ b1, c1 ⇀ d1) ⊓I1⊗I2 (a2 ⇀ b2, c2 ⇀ d2))
= predI1⊗I2((a1 ⇀ b1) ⊓A⇒B (a2 ⇀ b2), (c1 ⇀ d1) ⊓C⇒D (c2 ⇀ d2)) by (28)
= predI1⊗I2((a1 ⊔A a2) ⇀ (b1 ⊓B b2), (c1 ⊔C c2) ⇀ (d1 ⊓D d2)) by(17)
= predA(a1 ⊔A a2) ∧ predC(c1 ⊔C c2)→ predB(b1 ⊓B b2) ∨ predD(d1 ⊓D d2)by(29)
⇒ ((predA(a1)∨predA(a2))∧(predC(c1)∨predC(c2)))→ ((predB(b1)∧predB(b2))∨
(predD(d1) ∧ predD(d2))) by (2) and (3)
= ((predA(a1)∧predA(a2))∨ (predC(c1)∧predC(c2)))∨ ((predB(b1)∧predB(b2))∨
(predD(d1) ∧ predD(d2))) by de Morgan
⇒ (predA(a1) ∨ predC(c1) ∨ predB(b1) ∨ predD(d1)) ∧ (predA(a2) ∨ predC(c2) ∨
predB(b2) ∨ predD(d2)) by de Morgan
= ((predA(a1)∧(predC(c1))→ (predB(b1)∨predD(d1))∧(predA(a2)∧predC(c2))→
(predB(b2) ∨ predD(d2)) by de Morgan
= predI1⊗I2(a1 ⇀ b1, c1 ⇀ d1) ∧ predI1⊗I2(a2 ⇀ b2, c2 ⇀ d2) by (29)RR n° 0123456789
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2From now, L stands for our bakground abstrat lattie; we assume it is stable byintersetion. It is intended to replae A and B in the impliation lattie above.3.5 Inferring loop invariants and funtion preonditionsIt is ommon to use forward AI to disover program invariants, as done in [3℄ or [22℄. Itonsists in propagating through the ontrol-ow graph an over-approximation of the setsof possible data values at eah point until it onverges. This is not suient in our modu-lar setting, sine a forward analysis annot generate funtion preonditions that guaranteeorretness. Our need for a ontextual analysis makes things even more omplex: plain AIworks over onvex sets; omplex tehniques like disjuntive ompletion or dynami valuetrae partitioning are needed in order to make AI ontextual. In order to build the desiredmodular and ontextual analysis, we use AI in a novel way desribed below.In the following, we identify an abstrat value produed by AI and the logial formuladesribing this abstrat value. This allows us to swith bak-and-forth between the AI viewand the prediate alulus view. At eah program point a memory aess is performed, wean express its safety as the validy of the formula φ given in Figures 21 and 22. Wheneverthe invariant I omputed by AI logially implies the formula φ reated this way, the memoryaess is safe.We used in our implementation the domain of otagons [28℄. This minimal relationaldomain is able to express all onstraints of the form ±x± y ≤ c where x and y are variablesand c is an integer onstant. This seems to be the most interesting domain for memoryanalysis, as argued in [22℄, although we might need a full relational domain when onsideringprograms with asts and unions. It is suient for exatly representing the linear onditionsthat we have introdued so far, either for our memory model, for transfer funtions over thismodel and for expressing the safety of aesses, when the index i is a variable or an integeronstant. Our method applies equally to any domain, with some of the most interestingfeatures (like loop elimination) applying only to relational domains.3.5.1 Initial forward propagationWe use forward AI as a rst step to generate invariants at eah program point. Duringthis propagation, we take into aount both assumptions, whether the preondition of thefuntion analyzed or the postonditions of alled funtions, and assertions, either alls tothe C funtion assert or logial assertions. This propagation step uses widening on loopbakedges as a means to onverge. Formulas expressing the safety of memory aesses areused here as logial assertions, so that a same memory aess is not heked twie. On ourexample, initial forward propagation produes the annotated ode shown in Figure 24.Further forward propagations build on the invariants omputed by initial forward prop-agation. We use this peuliarity to dene a one-pass renement operator, i.e. an operatorwhih replaes the normal looping and widening proess, so that iterating around loops isnot needed anymore. The simplest one-pass renement operator onsists in forgetting atINRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 31// requires: full_separated(dest , src)har⋆ foo(har⋆ dest, har⋆ sr, int s) {int sr_self_oset = 0;int s_self_oset = 0;int ur_oset = 0;if (dest == 0) return 0;// invariant: 0 ≤ cur_offset = src_self_offset ≤ −s_self_offsetwhile (s + s_self_oset−− > 0 && sr[sr_self_oset℄) {dest[ur_oset++℄ = sr[sr_self_oset++℄;}dest[ur_oset℄ = '\0';return dest;} Figure 24: Example (ont.): after initial forward propagationloop entry any new information on the variables modied in the loop. This is not suientto propagate new information on variables modied in the loop. For these variables, a betterone-pass renement operator onsists in performing a union between the new abstrat stateat loop entry from the one-pass forward propagation, and the abstrat state at loop endfrom the initial normal forward propagation. In our ontext of use, new information for-ward propagated from a newly omputed preondition or loop invariant is usually known tobe true at loop end after initial forward propagation. This is beause we use memory safetyonditions as logial assertion during initial forward propagation. It makes our one-passrenement operator very eetive at disovering new loop invariants.3.5.2 Starting point: memory safety onditionsAt label L where a memory aess is performed, we onsider the invariant I omputed byinitial forward propagation and the safety ondition φ. At this point, it is suient to provevalidity of impliation I → φ to prove the aess safe.If φ an be represented exatly in L, proving I → φ amounts to an inlusion querybetween abstrat values. Otherwise, we onsider the disjunts φi in φ and perform emptinessqueries on the onjunts φi ∧ I. In our ase, this would be probably more eient to resortto a simplex algorithm to solve these queries, as the otagon domain generates only linearonstraints.3.5.3 Bakward one-pass propagationIf the impliation formula I → φ annot be proved valid at label L where a memory aessis performed, we form the orresponding abstrat value in the impliation lattie L ⇒ L,and try to propagate this value up in the ode, in order either to prove it or to generateloop invariants and preonditions suient to prove it. This is not sound, as the impliationRR n° 0123456789
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I → φ is not guaranteed to be a valid formula: even if the memory aess is safe, it an bedue to some program logi that AI ould not apture in I. As a onsequene, the formulas
ψ → φ obtained by bakward propagation of I → φ are not guaranteed either to be validformulas. Inferring loop invariants and preonditions from these formulas is only a heuristimethod, with no ompleteness or soundness guarantee. Despite that, we will see it is veryeient at guessing appropriate loop invariants and preonditions for the kind of programswe onsider.Bakward propagation in AI has already been used for various reasons. Miné mentions itin his desription of the otagon domain [28℄ as a means to rene the invariants omputed byforward AI. Rival [33℄ uses bakward AI to understand the origin of the alarms generated byforward AI. The losest use to ours is the work of Bourdonle who tries in [7℄ to propagatebakward an over-approximation of the states that do not lead to an error. Although hiswork inspired ours, our bak-and-forth propagation is ompletely dierent from his bakwardpropagation, that is simply the bakward version of normal forward propagation. We willexplain in Setion 6 why our method supersedes his. Our goal is to propagate simultaneously:1. an over-approximation of the set of states from whih it is possible to reah label L,2. and an over-approximation of the set of states from whih all sequenes of steps thatreah label L result in validity of φ.At label L, the rst set of states orresponds to I and the seond set of states orresponds to
φ. We see immediately that the desired propagation orresponds to operation ⋒A⇒B on theimpliation lattie L ⇒ L. We delay to Setion 4 the explainations on how we implementthis eiently with otagons.Exept for loops, nearly lassial bakward transfer funtions are applied on both partsof the impliation abstrat value. For now, it is suient to know that transfer funtions on
ψ → φ add ontext to the left-hand part ψ only, while modifying the right-hand part φ toget the orret over-approximation. This adds path-sensitive information to the formula, sothat it is easier to prove it valid. In partiular, a ontextual preondition for the funtionis inferred if the formula I → φ propagates all the way up to the funtion entry, while stillbeing in the form of an impliation ψ → φ, with ψ neither empty not implied by an existingpreondition. The formula ψ → φ beomes a new preondition for the funtion.3.5.4 Loop eliminationTwo ases are possible one the abstrat value representing an impliation formula ψ → φreahes a loop head during bakward propagation.1. The right-hand part φ of the impliation does not mention variables modied in theloop. It is suient to forget those variables in the left-hand part ψ of the impliationto produe a andidate loop invariant ψ′ → φ.2. The right-hand part φ of the impliation mentions variables modied in the loop. Inmost ases, simply forgetting those variables in the formula removes the right-handpart altogether. We need smarter elimination strategies. INRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 33We dene several elimination strategies or heuristis to deal with ase 2. Suppose thereis only one variable v that is both modied in the loop and present in φ. Dealing withmore than one suh variable onsists in applying the same treatment for eah one. We nowdetail eah heuristi with some explainations for why it might be a good guess at the orretinvariant.1. Fourier-Motzkin eliminationWe use it in the ases where v has a lower bound (resp. an upper bound) in bothparts of the impliation. These bound an easily be made non-strit by inrementingor derementing them by one, sine the underlying type is integer. We rewrite theimpliation formula by ignoring all other sub-formulas:
v ≥ lhs_bound→ v ≥ rhs_bound (31)Validity of equation 31 where v is universally quantied is equivalent to the followingformula, obtained through Fourier-Motzkin elimination of v.
lhs_bound ≥ rhs_bound (32)2. Transitive eliminationWe use it in the ases where v has a lower bound (resp. an upper bound) in theleft-hand part of the impliation, and an upper bound (resp. a lower bound) in theright-hand part of the impliation. Again, we rewrite the impliation formula by ig-noring all other sub-formulas:
v ≥ lhs_bound→ v ≤ rhs_bound (33)If the ontext for this impliation is reahable (there exists v suh that v ≥ lhs_bound),then for this partiular value of v we get an equivalent formula:
v ≥ lhs_bound ∧ v ≤ rhs_bound (34)Validity of equation 34 where v is existentially quantied is equivalent to the followingformula, obtained through Fourier-Motzkin elimination of v.
lhs_bound ≤ rhs_bound (35)3. Min-max Fourier-Motzkin eliminationWe use it when more than one lower bound (resp. more than one upper bound) isavailable for Fourier-Motzkin elimination, as desribed above. E.g., the impliationformula rewritten by ignoring all other sub-formulas ould look like:
v ≥ lhs_bound1 ∧ v ≥ lhs_bound2→ v ≥ rhs_bound (36)
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34 Moy & MarhéIn that ase, we reover the normal Fourier-Motzkin elimination by using the speialmeta-variable generators min and max desribed in Setion 3.3:
v ≥ max(lhs_bound1, lhs_bound2)→ v ≥ rhs_bound (37)Applying the elimination strategy seen above, we get:
max(lhs_bound1, lhs_bound2) ≥ rhs_bound (38)4. Min-max Transitive eliminationWe use it when more than one lower bound (resp. more than one upper bound) isavailable for Transitive elimination, as desribed above. E.g., the impliation formularewritten by ignoring all other sub-formulas ould look like:
v ≥ lhs_bound1 ∧ v ≥ lhs_bound2→ v ≤ rhs_bound (39)In that ase, we reover the normal Transitive elimination by using the speial meta-variable generators min and max desribed in Setion 3.3:
v ≥ max(lhs_bound1, lhs_bound2)→ v ≤ rhs_bound (40)Applying the elimination strategy seen above, we get:
max(lhs_bound1, lhs_bound2) ≤ rhs_bound (41)In our experiments, we notied that applying Fourier-Motzkin (normal or min-max ver-sion) whenever possible gives better results. Therefore we favor this heuristi over Transitiveelimination. The presene of variables arrlen(p) in the left-hand part of the impliationaused loop invariants of the form arrlen(p) < s → φ to be inferred. These formulas aretotally meaningless for a C program, beause the programmer has no way to test the allo-ated size of a memory blok after it has been alloated. Therefore we remove all variables
arrlen(p) from the left-hand part of the impliation before elimination, to inrease the oddsof nding a meaningful loop invariant. Overall, applying any of these eliminations allows usto avoid iterating around loops, whih is a key feature for salability.3.5.5 Contextual one-pass forward propagationOne loop invariants and preonditions have been generated by bakward propagation, theyan be onsidered for a forward one-pass propagation through the ode. In the ontextof AI×DV, the goal might be to prove as many memory aesses as possible. In bothveriation frameworks it avoids performing bakward propagation again from a memoryaess that ould be proved safe using the newly generated logial annotations. This leadsto a bak-and-forth algorithm where we onsider eah memory aess in turn.Forward propagation of impliation abstrat values a ⇀ b uses the union and intersetionoperations of the impliation lattie as dened above. Contrary to what is done duringINRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 35bakward propagation, ontext is not added to the left-hand side a of the impliation.Indeed, the impliation abstrat value is kept as simple as possible, while omputing anunder-approximation of its left-hand side and an over-approximation of its right-hand side.This minimizes the possible loss of information during unions where paths merge. Asidefrom this impliation value, we still onsider the normal abstrat value without impliationused e.g., during initial forward propagation. Whenever the left-hand side pred(a) of theimpliation is implied by the normal abstrat value at this point, we add the orrespondingright-hand side b of the impliation to the normal abstrat value. The delared objetiveof this step is to add enough information to the abstrat value desribing the urrent stateso that the new omputed invariant I ′ implies the safety of the memory aess that startedthis bak-and-forth pass (and maybe others too), or equivalently that pred(I ′)→ φ is valid.We an now express the renement operator for impliation abstrat values. Let Iand J be the normal abstrat values at loop entry and loop end, a ⇀ b the impliationabstrat value reahing loop entry. Our modied one-pass renement operator returns asnew invariant for the loop the value:
RL⇒L(I , J , a ⇀ b)
∆
= a ⇀ avalL(predL((I ⊓ a ⊓ b) ⊔ J ) \ predL(I )), (42)where \ is a logial subtration, suh that φ\ψ removes from the onjunts of φ thoseonjunts also in ψ. Remember that L is stable by intersetion.Theorem 5 One-pass renement operators RL⇒L orretly over-approximates the mostpreise loop invariant.Proof.
predL⇒L(RL⇒L(I , J , a ⇀ b))
= predL⇒L(a ⇀ avalL(predL((I ⊓ a ⊓ b) ⊔ J ) \ predL(I ))) by (42)
← predL(a)→ predL ◦ avalL(predL((I ⊓ a ⊓ b) ⊔ J ) \ predL(I )) by (15)
← predL(a)→ (predL((I ⊓ a ⊓ b) ⊔ J ) \ predL(I )) by (4)
← predL(a)→ predL((I ⊓ a ⊓ b) ⊔ J )At loop entry, urrent invariant is:
Inventry = predL(I ) ∧ predL⇒L(a ⇀ b) = predL(I ) ∧ (predL(a)→ predL(b)) (43)Therefore, at loop entry:
predL⇒L(RL⇒L(I , J , a ⇀ b))
← predL(a)→ predL(I ⊓ a ⊓ b) by (2)
= predL(a)→ (predL(I ) ∧ predL(a) ∧ predL(b)) by (5)
← predL(I ) ∧ (predL(a)→ predL(b))
= Inventry by (43)At loop end, urrent invariant is:
Invend = predL(J ) (44)Therefore, at loop end:RR n° 0123456789
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predL⇒L(RL⇒L(I , J , a ⇀ b))
← predL(a)→ predL(J ) by (2)
← predL(J )
= Invend by (44)
2It an be seen as the ounterpart for impliation abstrat values of the one-pass rene-ment seen in Setion 3.5.1. It has the same good property that allows disovering new loopinvariants: new forward propagated information that is already known to be true at loopend is kept in the loop invariant.3.5.6 Flashbak: the ase of stringsAs seen in equation 11, being a string is equivalent to some linear inequation involving thelength of the string. This inequation an be represented in the abstrat domain we workwith, using strlen(p) as a meta-variable, as seen in Setion 3.2. Therefore, we an use thebak-and-forth propagation just desribed to infer loop invariants and preonditions that arelikely to guarantee a pointer is a string at some point in the program. On our example, stringinferene using bakward propagation produes the annotated ode shown in Figure 25.// requires: full_separated(dest , src)// ∧ 1 ≤ s → 0 ≤ strlen(src)har⋆ foo(har⋆ dest, har⋆ sr, int s) {int sr_self_oset = 0;int s_self_oset = 0;int ur_oset = 0;if (dest == 0) return 0;// invariant: 0 ≤ cur_offset = src_self_offset ≤ −s_self_offset// ∧ 1 ≤ s → 0 ≤ strlen(src)while (s + s_self_oset−− > 0 && sr[sr_self_oset℄) {dest[ur_oset++℄ = sr[sr_self_oset++℄;}dest[ur_oset℄ = '\0';return dest;} Figure 25: Example (ont.): after string inferene (bakward only)Before propagating forward these preonditions and loop invariants, we should look morelosely at what it means to be a string in C. Using idiom 5, we an add information on
strlen(s) whenever testing the (non-)nullity of some string aess s[i]. Indeed, the nullityof s[i] an be understood as the equality i = strlen(s) and the non-nullity of s[i] as theinequality i < strlen(s). This must be added as an assumption on eah branh that originates
INRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 37in a (non-)nullity test of s[i]. It is not an assertion, that ould not be used in omputingloop invariants, as seen when disussing initial forward propagation.On our example, the initial forward propagation produed i ≤ strlen(src) at loop end,and the urrent ontextual forward propagation gives invariant 1 ≤ s → i ≤ strlen(src) atloop entry. If this invariant was not ontextual (e.g., for C funtion strlen, we get simply
i ≤ strlen(src)), using the improved one-pass renement operator that we saw for initialforward propagation would produe a generalized loop invariant i ≤ strlen(src). With anadditionnal ontextual part, this does not work. We built a one-pass generalizing renementoperator that does the same for ontextual formulas like here, in most simple ases. Onour example, using this one-pass generalizing renement operator, the ontextual forwardpropagation that follows string inferene produes the annotated ode shown in Figure 26.This is suient to prove the orretness of aesses to src, by AI only.// requires: full_separated(dest , src)// ∧ 1 ≤ s → 0 ≤ strlen(src)har⋆ foo(har⋆ dest, har⋆ sr, int s) {int sr_self_oset = 0;int s_self_oset = 0;int ur_oset = 0;if (dest == 0) return 0;// invariant: 0 ≤ cur_offset = src_self_offset ≤ −s_self_offset// ∧ 1 ≤ s → −s_self_offset ≤ strlen(src)while (s + s_self_oset−− > 0 && sr[sr_self_oset℄) {dest[ur_oset++℄ = sr[sr_self_oset++℄;}dest[ur_oset℄ = '\0';return dest;} Figure 26: Example (ont.): after string inferene3.6 Proving memory safetyOn our example, applying our bak-and-forth methods produes the annotated ode shownin Figure 27. If we onsider the AI×DV veriation framework, AI alone is able to prove thatfuntion foo is memory safe with these annotations. If we onsider the AI+DV veriationframework, Simplify and Yies prove all safety veriation onditions generated using theseannotations.
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hé// requires: full_separated(dest , src)// ∧ 1 ≤ s → 0 ≤ strlen(src)// ∧ 1 ≤ s → min(s, strlen(src)) < arrlen(dest)// ∧ s ≤ 0 → 0 < arrlen(dest)har⋆ foo(har⋆ dest, har⋆ sr, int s) {int sr_self_oset = 0;int s_self_oset = 0;int ur_oset = 0;if (dest == 0) return 0;// invariant: 0 ≤ cur_offset = src_self_offset ≤ −s_self_offset// ∧ 1 ≤ s → −s_self_offset ≤ strlen(src)// ∧ 1 ≤ s → min(s, strlen(src)) < arrlen(dest)// ∧ s ≤ 0 → 0 < arrlen(dest)while (s + s_self_oset−− > 0 && sr[sr_self_oset℄) {dest[ur_oset++℄ = sr[sr_self_oset++℄;}dest[ur_oset℄ = '\0';return dest;} Figure 27: Example (ont.): after bak-and-forth inferene3.7 Adding useful prediates to ontextThe preonditions generated so far are not ompletely satisfatory. The nullity test on destis not taken into aount, as it annot be represented in our abstrat domain of otagons.Treating dest as an integer variable would allow us to represent ondition dest = 0 , but notondition dest 6= 0 that we are interested in.To inlude arbitrary equalities and disequalities in our ontext, we add a very basiprediate domain that only follows equalities and disequalities. We form a redued produtbetween this domain and the otagon domain used for the left-hand part of an impliation.On our example, using this prediate domain produes the desired preonditions, as shownin Figure 28.3.8 Overall methodFinally, our method onsists in the three propagation phases that are skethed in bold arrowson the diagrams in Figure 29, where the last two phases are alled in turn for eah memoryaess. We detail the preise algorithm in Figure 30.
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Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 39// requires: full_separated(dest , src)// ∧ (dest 6= 0 ∧ 1 ≤ s) → 0 ≤ strlen(src)// ∧ (dest 6= 0 ∧ 1 ≤ s) → min(s, strlen(src)) < arrlen(dest)// ∧ (dest 6= 0 ∧ s ≤ 0 ) → 0 < arrlen(dest)har⋆ foo(har⋆ dest, har⋆ sr, int s) {int sr_self_oset = 0;int s_self_oset = 0;int ur_oset = 0;if (dest == 0) return 0;// invariant: 0 ≤ cur_offset = src_self_offset ≤ −s_self_offset// ∧ 1 ≤ s → −s_self_offset ≤ strlen(src)// ∧ 1 ≤ s → min(s, strlen(src)) < arrlen(dest)// ∧ s ≤ 0 → 0 < arrlen(dest)while (s + s_self_oset−− > 0 && sr[sr_self_oset℄) {dest[ur_oset++℄ = sr[sr_self_oset++℄;}dest[ur_oset℄ = '\0';return dest;} Figure 28: Example (ont.): with basi prediate domain
FUNCTION 
END
FUNCTION 
BEGIN
LOOP 
HEAD
MEMORY 
ACCESSCall-graph FUNCTION END
FUNCTION 
BEGIN
LOOP 
HEAD
MEMORY 
ACCESSInitial forwardpropagation FUNCTION END
FUNCTION 
BEGIN
LOOP 
HEAD
MEMORY 
ACCESSContextual one-passbakward propaga-tion FUNCTION END
FUNCTION 
BEGIN
LOOP 
HEAD
MEMORY 
ACCESSContextual one-passforward propagationFigure 29: Sketh of the method4 ImplementationOur implementation is roughly 10.000 lines of Oaml for the plugin part inside Cadueus,and a few hundreds lines of C to path the available otagon library [28℄. Both modulesommuniate using the Oaml binding of the otagon library. Our plugin and otagon
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40 Moy & Marhé1. perform loal aliasing analysis and transform program2. perform interproedural separation analysis and annotate program3. perform initial forward propagation and add loop invariants4. dene proedure bak-and-forth (formula φ, program point L) as(a) all I the invariant omputed by AI at L(b) build the formula I → φ() propagate I → φ bakward from L in a single pass:use bakward AI exept for loopsuse speial elimination for loops(d) if formula propagated still ontextual at funtion or loop beginning theni. add it as new funtion preondition or new loop invariantii. propagate these new assumptions forward using AIiii. use the impliation domain transfer funtions and operations5. for eah string typestate (idioms (2) and (3)) in the program doif string typestate proved by AIthen do nothingelse all bak-and-forth with φ whose validity implies string typestatedone6. for eah memory aess in the program doif memory aess proved by AIthen do nothingelse all bak-and-forth with φ whose validity implies safety for the aessdone7. if doing AI×DVthen set as denitely proved the memory aesses proved by AI8. if some memory aesses and annotations not provedthen all DV on the generated veriation onditionsFigure 30: Method for proving the memory safety of C pointer programs
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Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 41path, as well as the Cadueus and Why tools, are freely available from [27℄. We supportthe full Ansi C language aepted by Cadueus (that exludes asts and unions) by limitingour analysis to funtions that ontain statements of the kind desribed in this paper. Thedynami alloation we desribed using operator new is in fat reognized as alls to standardC library funtion malloc of the form:
new t[n] ≡ (t∗) malloc(sizeof(t) ∗ n)All basi C types are supported, as well as arrays. Loops may be of any form (for , while,
do − while) and ontain break , continue or goto statements that do not enter sopes.The impliation domain is based on the otagon one. Instead of dening the left part ofthe impliation to be an otagon and the right part another otagon, we pak both parts inone otagon. This is an important deision both for salability and simpliity. The drawbakof this deision is that we annot represent formulas like x > 0→ x > 10, beause the sameinequality is used on both sides of the formula. This may seem like an unimportant matter,but it prevented us from representing nullity of pointers as the nullity of their alloatedsize, beause then we generated formulas like the above, with arrlen(p) for x. This hoierespets relations 15 and 18.In order to distinguish between inequalities that belong to the left part and inequalitiesthat belong to the right part, we simply tag inequalities from the right part (usually oneor two only). One of the most important operation on otagons, the losure omputation,has to be restrited to the untagged inequalities. Closing an otagon derives the tighestpossible bounds on eah onsidered inequality of the form ±x ± y ≤ c. Our restritionprevents merging inequalities from the left and the right parts of an impliation. We usein our implementation the impliation produt of this otagon impliation lattie Ioct andthe lattie P= 6= of simple prediates based on equalities and disequalities. This is possiblebeause the latter is isomorphi to the onstant impliation lattie P= 6= ⇒ False.The transfer funtion for test only adds untagged inequalities, whih ensures that we onlyadd ontext to the left part of an impliation, as said in Setion 3.5. The transfer funtion forassignment modies all existing inequalities, but adds only untagged inequalities. Modiedinequalities keep their tagging status. This again ensures we keep the right part of theimpliation minimal while still being orret.Eah impliation formula set as funtion preondition or loop invariant by our methodreeives a new identifying number, so that forward propagation of more than one impliationabstrat value orretly unions orresponding abstrat values after branhing.Conversion between otagons and rst-order formulas is quite simple. Starting froma rst-order formula, we onsider eah one of its onjunts and onstrain an initially fullotagon (⊤) with these onjunts, using the transfer funtion for test. Starting from anotagon, we onvert it to hollow form [28℄, a kind of minimization, and we output theonjuntion of the inequalities in this minimal form. This minimization step is ruial tomake elimination work properly.In this paper, we only used loop invariants. In our implementation, we distinguishbetween loop (asserted) invariants and loop assumed invariants. The assumed version isRR n° 0123456789
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héused to store invariants proved by AI, so that we do not need to prove them again using DVin the ontext of AI×DV. This makes it possible to fully prove funtions with loops usingonly AI. The normal loop invariant then stores the invariant part that ould not be provedby AI, either beause it was provided by the programmer, or beause it was inferred by ourmethod but not proved by forward propagation.5 ExperimentsThe standard string library as dened by Ansi C presents a good mix of pointer and stringmanipulations, with many impliit preonditions only given in textual desription, like theoverlapping onditions. Sine available implementations are heavily optimized, using bit-eld manipulations or assembly ode, we hand-oded a forward implementation of headerstring, that would be both simple and idiomati. Sine Cadueus does not aept asts, wemodied the signature of string funtions involving void∗ parameters or returns, to replaethem by char∗. To infer the subtle invariants used by these funtions, we had to take intoaount the laziness of boolean operations in C. Indeed, it is quite ommon in C to writetests where the right operand of a boolean operation is safe only if its left operand has anexpeted outome (true or false).On this implementation, we suessfully generated the neessary annotations and auto-matially proved memory safety for 18 funtions out of a total of 22. The four remainingfuntions are strat and strnat, whih require inferring linear inequations involving threevariables (whih is not possible with the otagon domain only) and strtok and strerr,whih require inferring global invariants. With additional hand-written annotations, wealso veried automatially these four funtions.As an example of an apparently omplex yet orret preondition generated by ourmethod, here is the preondition we generate for the funtion strnpy (whih uses logialfuntion min presented in Setion 3.3):// requires (1 ≤ n → 0 ≤ strlen(src))// ∧ (1 ≤ n ∧ 0 ≤ strlen(src)) → min(n − 1 , strlen(src)) < arrlen(dest)// ∧ (2 ≤ n → n ≤ arrlen(dest))// ∧ full_separated(dest , src)A quik ase analysis on the value of n leads to the equivalent simpler formula, whih looksmore like a valid preondition for strnpy that a programmer would speify:// requires (n ≤ 0 ∨ (0 ≤ strlen(src) ∧ n ≤ arrlen(dest))) ∧ full_separated(dest , src)In Figure 31, we ompare our results on the standard string library with those ofPolySpae C Verier [31℄, a popular tool for debugging large pointer-intensive C programs.Although it is mostly used as a debugging tool for standalone programs, PolySpae is really averiation tool based on abstrat interpretation. It ags every possible runtime error in theode as an orange hek while it outputs green heks on veried statements. We are only
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Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 43Cadueus PolySpaenummem funproved ratiomem funproved numstr funproved ratiostr funproved nummem funproved ratiomem funproved numstr funproved ratiostr funprovedinitial 5 100% 13 87% 5 100% 2 13%rewritten 5 100% 13 87% 5 100% 2 13%Figure 31: Results on Cadueus and PolySpaeinterested here in the olor of invalid pointer dereferene heks (a.k.a. IDP) whih verifythe validity of dereferenes. This makes it possible to ompare the number of funtions onwhih PolySpae only produes green IDP with the number of funtions whose veriationonditions (VC) are all proved by the automati provers alled by Cadueus.We rst ranked eah tool results on our implementation of the standard string library.The omparison was problemati beause the modular setting of PolySpae onservativelyassumes pointer arguments an be null, whih auses many orange IDP. In Cadueus, thegenerated preonditions ontextually rule out those ases. Therefore, we added a mainfuntion similar to the one generated by PolySpae, exept we built a simple valid ontextfor alling funtions. In order to distinguish between the benets we get from our annotationproess and those we get from initial loal aliasing transformation, we ran this experimentagain with initial soure ode rewritten by our loal aliasing transformation.Comparison is run on self-ontained funtions not relying on global invariants, whihrules out funtions strtok and strerror. Remaining funtions are divided into memoryor string funtions, aording to prex (either mem or str). PolySpae and Cadueusorretly prove all memory funtions. As seen previously, the memory model for strings al-lows Cadueus to infer orret preonditions for most string funtions. On these funtions,onsidered inherently unsafe in some software ompanies [19℄, PolySpae onservatively out-puts orange IDP. Interestingly, PolySpae does prove funtion strnpy, that only performsbounded aesses on its arguments. PolySpae gives the same results on rewritten ode ason initial ode, whih inreases our ondene that our modular and ontextual annotationmethod is responsible for Cadueus good results. Soure programs and Cadueus results areavailable from http://www.lri.fr/~moy.6 Related workOur work owes muh to the early work of Bourdonle [7℄. Long before abstrat interpretationwas used to ompletely prove the safety of large programs [5℄, he attempted to use a ombi-nation of forward and bakward propagations to loate possible errors in programs, whihhe alled abstrat debugging. He too foused on array bound heking. But his bakwardpropagation from assertions (the ones he alls invariant assertions) merges the onditions
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44 Moy & Marhéto reah the program point where the assertion is performed and the onditions to make thisassertion valid. These are the parts we separate in our impliation abstrat value. In hismethod, it makes it neessary to union the abstrat state that we propagate bakward withabstrat states obtained from forward propagation on other branhes, whenever reahing abranhing or a loop beginning. This is the reason why he gets his most interesting resultswith intermittent assertions, where the programmer additionnally states that every orretexeution through the funtion should reah that assertion point, and only when forwardanalysis already determinated aurate invariants. He used the simplest domain for AI, theinterval domain. Sine then, more aurate and yet eient domains have been devised forAI, like the one we use, the otagon domain [28℄.The next work losest to ours, in its objetives and desription, is the modular hekerfor buer overows of [19℄. Their annotation language based on properties, whih wouldbe uninterpreted funtions in our setting, allows them to modularly hek eah funtionseparately, like we do. They devised an unsound inferene method to generate automatiallysome of these properties, like we do. The main dierene with our work is that their hekerdoes not verify the safety of memory aesses, but simply reports likely errors. The seondimportant dierene is that our method is ontextual, theirs is ontext-sensitive, with theirinferene method using aller's information to rene allee's one. Our ontextual infereneallows us to treat funtions like strcpy , and more importantly to infer dierent funtionpreonditions for dierent ontexts, both things their method annot do and that theydesribe as unannotatable interfaes. We must say that the hoies they make allow themto apply their heker to millions of lines of legay ode.Historially, stati array bound heking was one of the rst diult properties about pro-grams that people tried to prove, originally on Pasal programs. Cousot and Halbwahs [12℄applied abstrat interpretation over polyhedrons and managed to hek the memory safetyof an implementation of heapsort, using manual preonditions. A year later, Suzuki andIshihata [35℄ used a omputation of weakest preonditions together with dedutive veri-ation to hek the memory safety of an implementation of tree sort. They already usedFourier-Motzkin elimination at loop beginnings as a renement heuristi on rst-order linearformulas.Some features of our approah have been used previously for optimization or veriationpurposes. Gupta [17℄ studied the forward propagation of assertions to avoid repeated run-time array bound heks. Our work applies the per-path summary approah of debuggingtools like Prex [9℄ or Arher [37℄ in a formally justied way amenable to veriation.Various veriation tools use funtion symbols muh like arrlen and strlen in order to dis-tinguish between alloated size and string length: Boon [36℄, Cssv [14℄, Overlook [2℄. Allthese tools use those funtion symbols to transform pointer programs into integer ones.BOON then solves the safety problem as an integer onstraint problem, CSSV as an integerprogramming problem and Overlook using AI. A key dierene with our approah is theannotation inferene method used. BOON only targets violations of string library API,using a oarse unsound ow-insensitive analysis, whih makes inferene useless. CSSV usesa sound inferene method based on weakest preonditions and strongest postonditions that
INRIA
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king C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 45annot infer the kind of subtle loop invariants we target. Overlook uses forward AI as itsonly invariant generation method, whih is not suient in most ases. Another key dier-ene with us is their oarse treatement of aliasing whih is at most a ow-insensitive wholeprogram analysis. This prevents them from automatially verifying programs the way wedo.The neessity for some logial speiation of pointer separation in C dates bak to C99standard [21℄, with the addition of the restrict keyword. Various authors have desribedannotation-based systems to help programmers speify pointer separation [1, 24℄. This hasbeen pushed forward as a kind of logi about pointer programs by Reynolds in separationlogi [32℄. Our loal separation analysis was inspired from these works, with the emphasis onloality and automati inferene. In support of our treatment of loal aliasing, the frequenyof ursor aliasing in real embedded software has been noted by [18℄.Many tools based on DV have been used to perform full veriation of pointer-intensiveprograms like the Shorr-Waite algorithm used in garbage olletion. In our setting, itwas done with Why in [20℄. Suh full veriations ask for a large amount of user workto provide appropriate annotations, as well as deep understanding of the logial setting ofthe tool. We only attempt at partial veriation of quite simple properties of programs,whih is why we expet to need few user interation. Reently, there have been attemptsat using a ombination of various proof tehniques. In [22℄, AI is used as a rst phase toompute invariants about the program that are used in a seond phase to seed the prediateabstration. Interestingly, they also use the otagon library [28℄. In [26℄, a real feedbak loopis built between AI and DV. Starting from a ounter-example generated by DV, bakward AIis applied, and eah loop involved in the ounter-example is examined by a speial inferenemethod to get more preise loop invariants in the ontext of the ounter-example. Althoughvery promising, this approah suers from the high ost of alling DV repeatedly. In Boogie,the tool developed in the same team, AI is used only in a rst phase to ompute invariantsabout the program [3℄. Furthermore, it annot generate preonditions.Instead of using DV as safety net when stati analysis fails to prove memory aessessafe, a pratial approah is to rely on runtime heks. Projets CCured and Cylone explorethis option in two dierent diretions. CCured [30℄ aims at seuring large legay odes. Itis based on a ompiler that instruments C ode with possibly expensive runtime heks, toensure memory safety. Although an attempt at proving the orretion of aesses in thegenerated ode was done with Blast [4℄, it was harder than on the original program, due tothe instrumentation ode added by CCured. Cylone [23℄ aims at providing programmerswith a safer C language, that still allows eient ode while failitating porting from C.The restritions it imposes on programs are interesting points to look at if we want to allowautomati veriation of suh onstruts with our method. Sine we too use stati analysisin the rst phase of our method, our inferene method ould probably be used with protin the ontext of these tools.
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46 Moy & Marhé7 Future workIn order to deal with real programs, our next steps are the treatment of double indiretion,asts and strutures. Unions ombine the diulties of asts and strutures. Before doingso, we need to gather idioms on the ways C programmers use invariants to prevent memoryerrors when using double indiretion, asts, strutures and unions. We will then only laksupport for memory dealloation, to be added later on.A ruial point here is that we need to hek the proposed idioms on large bases of pro-grams, if we want them to be reliable. This an only be done through ode instrumentationand runtime heking, muh as what CCured does. Akin to what is done in CCured, weneed rst to determine by stati analysis whih pointers are base pointers and whih arestrings. This is slightly dierent from what is done in CCured as CCured only deals withtypes whereas we deal with typestates. We plan to do this heking in Cat, a tool dediatedto the veriation of C programs. Like CCured, it is based on Cil [29℄.An interesting feature of our bakward propagation that we have not exploited yet is itsability to prove a memory aess safe. Indeed, it may be the ase that forward AI did notprove an aess safe beause it merged two paths. When doing bakward propagation, itmay be the ase that on eah suh path the propagated impliation formula beomes true.If no over-approximation was made on the right part of the impliation, this is suient toprove the memory aess safe. This is the ase e.g., on the example presented in [26℄, wherethe assertion to prove is also extrated from a memory safety ondition.There is also plae for improvement in our separation analysis. On our example, it infers
full_separated(dest , src), while the most preise annotation would be
bound_separated(dest , strlen(src), src, strlen(src)).Using the results of AI would make it possible to bound more preisely the loations readand written by a funtion, whih would make it possible to rene the separation onditionsinferred.Various implementation issues deserve a better treatment. To improve preision, we oulduse the abstrat state omputed by forward propagation when performing bakward one, aspresented in [28℄. When eieny beomes a problem, we should review our implementationof the impliation otagon lattie, that urrently separates both parts of the impliation inOaml ode before alling C funtions on eah part. We ould probably implement all thismore eiently in C.We mentioned in this paper the degree of ondene that we should have in suh andedutive veriation, in Setion 3.1. Clearly, AI+DV is safer yet less powerful than AI×DV.This allows us to gain ondene in AI×DV by omparing its results with AI+DV whenpossible. To inrease the degree of ondene in AI+DV, we an use dierent automatiprovers on the same veriation onditions. The only unsafe part left is the loal aliasingtransformation, where we modify programs without proving formally that semantis arepreserved. It is in fat possible to drop this transformation, all other things being equal,by doing the opposite transformation on the annotations added by our method. On our
INRIA
Cheking C Pointer Programs for Memory Safety 47// requires: full_separated(dest , src)// ∧ (dest 6= 0 ∧ 1 ≤ s) → 0 ≤ strlen(src)// ∧ (dest 6= 0 ∧ 1 ≤ s) → min(s, strlen(src)) < arrlen(dest)// ∧ (dest 6= 0 ∧ s ≤ 0 ) → 0 < arrlen(dest)har⋆ foo(har⋆ dest, har⋆ sr, int s) {har⋆ ur = dest;if (dest == 0) return 0;// invariant: 0 ≤ cur − dest = src − old(src) ≤ old(s) − s// ∧ 1 ≤ s → old(s) − s ≤ strlen(old(src))// ∧ 1 ≤ s → min(s, strlen(old(src))) < arrlen(dest)// ∧ s ≤ 0 → 0 < arrlen(dest)while (s−− > 0 && ⋆sr) {
⋆ur++ = ⋆sr++;}
⋆ur = '\0';return dest;} Figure 32: Example (ont.): without program transformationexample, this results in the program shown in Figure 32. The annotation old(p) is used forthe value of p at the beginning of the funtion.8 ConlusionWe presented a new stati method for heking the memory safety of pointer-intensive Cprograms. Our analysis is inomplete: it expets programs to follow ommonly used C id-ioms. Our analysis is sound: whenever programs do not follow the idioms we seleted, it failsto verify them. This method relies on an unsound inferene algorithm, based on forwardand bakward abstrat interpretation, to generate the neessary logial annotations, mostlyfuntion preonditions and loop invariants. Soundness is obtained by dedutive veriation.This algorithm was speially designed for modular and ontextual veriation. In parti-ular, we rafted a speial impliation domain for abstrat interpretation. We showed howto implement it eiently using a relational domain, whih we did for the otagon domain.This makes the impliation domain a heap disjuntive domain for ontextual analysis. Wepresented two previously unknown latties for loal pointer aliasing and loal pointer non-aliasing. We showed that speial symbols ould be used both as meta-variable generators inabstrat interpretation and as uninterpreted funtions in dedutive veriation. This allowedollaboration between abstrat interpretation and dedutive veriation, as well as dedu-tive veriation of existential properties (e.g., the fat a pointer is a string). Altogether, weshowed our method ould be used to prove the memory safety of C pointer programs that
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48 Moy & Marhéno other available tool an handle. We are looking forward to applying it to more realistiprograms, when we have added support for more onstruts of C.
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